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In order to make novel observations about the role assigned to talion 
in Exod 21:23-25, Deut 19:21, and Lev 24:18-20, I wish to address first 
some problems much discussed in the scholarly literature about the 
Deuteronomic law concerning false testimony (Deut 19: 15-21 ). I shall 
claim that these problems are resolved on the basis of a straightforward, 
if sophisticated, approach. We must take seriously the fiction that Moses 
composed the law. As a prophet Moses anticipated Israel's future 
problems -for example, the false testimony that resulted in the death of 
the innocent Naboth, just as he anticipated the people's request for a 
king. What I am saying, of course, is that the Deuteronomist, living 
after these events, is Moses. Just as critics readily recognize the Deuter-
onomist's hand in the presentation of the account of Naboth's death, so 
we should go further and recognize that the Deuteronomic laws them-
selves are the collected judgments of the Deuteronomist upon events 
before Moses's life time, during it, and after it. Fictionally, in the book 
of Deuteronomy, Moses delivers a farewell address. In doing so, he 
proceeds in a way that is characteristic of this literary convention: he 
looks back both on his own life as Israel's leader and on Israel's life 
before he became leader, and he also anticipates Israel's future. Only 
those events in his life time are explicitly referred to in order to sustain 
the fiction. 
When we evaluate a particular Deuteronomic law, for example, the 
one on false testimony, we should not try to relate it to some hypo-
thetical historical background. Such reconstruction of the real world of 
the past is virtually impossible because of the limited nature of the 
biblical sources and the lack of extra-biblical corroboration. Instead we 
should assume that the Deuteronomist is well acquainted with a rule 
about false testimony, for example, the one in the Book of the Covenant 
(Exod 23: 1) that in his time was already attributed to Moses. The same 
language about "a witness of violence" CCf!d /.liimiis) occurs in both 
Exod 23:1 and Deut 19:16. What the Deuteronomist has done is to 
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reformulate an existing rule about false testimony in light of the incident 
about Naboth. 
One problem about the Deuteronomic law is why it has to state that 
two or three witness-accusers and not one only are necessary in order to 
prosecute a wrong. For those scholars who recognize this problem of the 
unnecessary specification of the number of witnesses the solution lies in 
a historical approach. At some point in Israelite history one witness was 
sufficient to convict. The inherent injustice of this procedure was 
eventually seen and at some point the more progressive requirement of a 
plurality of witnesses was inserted into the law's formulation. This 
addition to an original text is still manifest, it is claimed, because the law 
proceeds (in v. 16) to speak of the one man maliciously witnessing 
against another. Apart from the speculative character of this solution 
and the attribution of a lack of care to the law's formulator (whose 
accuracy is taken so seriously by critics when interpreting other matters), 
its major flaw is the claim that the inherent injustice of accepting one 
man's testimony without corroboration was not seen from the beginning. 1 
The law's content can be viewed differently if we see it as a response 
to what occurred with Naboth. Jezebel, acting on behalf of her husband 
Ahab, came up with the idea of bringing a false charge against Na both, 
namely, that he had cursed God and the king. She knew, however, that 
in order to make the charge stick she had to enlist the cooperation of 
two witnesses who would go along with her malicious charge. From a 
procedural point of view, she was conforming to proper judicial practice. 
Her motivation is evil, but her action is correct. 2 The Deuteronomic 
lawgiver, in order to indicate that her underlying lawlessness should not 
confuse the correctness of her procedure, responds to this particular 
aspect of the narrative. A single person, Jezebel or, as the biblical author 
perceives it, Jezebel acting for her husband, cannot proceed against a 
member of the community. Instead two witnesses or more are required, 
as Jezebel recognized. Her direction in this matter was in line with 
Israelite legal tradition, the origin of which would be traced to Moses. In 
stating the law as he does, the Deuteronomist could claim that he was 
making explicit Moses's judgment of what constituted valid testimony. 
When the law switches from specifying the number of witnesses required 
for testimony to a concern with a single false witness the law reflects-in 
I. In CH 1-4, some thousand years before the Deuteronomist's time, the need for 
corroboration is recognized. Morgenstern ( 1930, p. 35) lays out the common view that the 
Deuteronomic law is confusing because a later addition modifies the earlier practice. 
2. See Daube's profound discussion (1985, pp. 2329-2346) of New Testament and 
Rabbinic responses to conduct that is externally proper but internally flawed. 
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the sense that it encapsulates at a more general level~the complex 
position in the narrative. We should think of a move by the lawgiver 
from observing the correctness of Jezebel's procedure to observing its 
underlying reality. One person, Jezebel, stands out as the leading 
conspirator, but her husband Ahab is held ultimately responsible for the 
offense against Na both (I Kgs 21: 19). The dispute between the two men 
in the law is analogous to the clash between Ahab and Naboth over the 
latter's ancestral property. When the lawgiver refers to the single false 
witness, he is perfectly aware that the witness is not acting alone. The 
situation contemplated can be as devious and complex as the one 
involving Naboth. 
A second problem that can be clarified by relating the law to the 
narrative is the use in the law of the term "defection" (siiriih) in reference 
to the accused: the false witness testifies against him "defection." Else-
where in biblical material the term has a religious sense: defecting, 
turning aside from, rebelling against God (Deut 13:5; Isa l :5, 31 :6, 
59:13; Jer 28:16, 29:32). Driver (1902, p. 235) points out that the 
Deuteronomic context appears to be an exception, in that defection 
from law and right is the sense. Once we assume, however, that the law 
has been shaped in light of the Naboth incident the use of the term siiriih 
becomes intelligible. Naboth was accused of cursing God and the king. 
Such an offense can be accurately characterized as rebellion against God 
and, further, as a repudiation of this particular society's constitutional 
structure. The Deuteronomist appears to have drawn out this basic sense 
when he speaks in his law of the offense as defection. It is nonetheless 
important to emphasize just how much a particular narrative influences 
a particular law, so that we should be careful before extending the 
meaning of siiriih in the way that Driver does. 
A third, major problem in the law yields a solution when the incident 
involving Naboth is again brought into association with the law. In the 
law a case that raises the issue of false testimony apparently bypasses the 
local courts and goes to the central authority for adjudication. Why is 
no attempt to adjudicate made at the local level? It cannot be that in the 
nature of things such a case is too difficult for the local elders to 
resolve. 3 In any event, in the law about taking difficult cases to the 
central authority, the initial judgment that the matter is too complicated 
for local decision is made by the local public authority (Deut l 7:8). In 
regard to a case of false testimony this initial step is not even hinted at: 
3. The solution of Driver, (1902, p. 236); but he gives no reason why a case involving 
false witness is more problematic than any other type of case. 
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"If a false witness rise up against any man to testify against him 
defection; then both the men, between whom the controversy is, shall 
stand before Yahweh, before the priests and the judges, which shall be in 
those days" (Deut 19:16, 17). The institution referred to is the supreme 
authority assumed to be already in existence when Moses lays down 
directions for taking difficult cases to it (Deut 17:8-13). Those who 
constituted it, a judge, or judges, and Ievitical priests, were made its 
representatives, so the Deuteronomist understood, after Aaron's failure 
to exercise supreme authority in the incident of the golden calf (Exodus 
32).4 
Illumination of the problem as to why local adjudication is lacking in 
the law is immediately forthcoming when we note that the local judiciary 
in Naboth's city, Jezreel, was also involved in the false testimony against 
him. Jezebel had sent to the elders and freemen of the city letters in 
Ahab's name enlisting their cooperation in the false charge against 
Naboth. In light of this local lawlessness it would appear that the 
Deuteronomic lawgiver judged that any case of false testimony against a 
man might involve such widespread local corruption. He consequently 
directed that the central court always handle any case involving false 
testimony. How realistic it is to think that many such cases might take 
on the complexion of the one involving Naboth is difficult to say. It may 
well be true that a false charge against someone, especially if he is 
viewed like Naboth (in I Kgs 21 :6, 7) as awkward in conforming to an 
expanding governmental authority, requires a good deal of cooperation 
among those with power in a community. If so, what happened to 
Naboth presents a not untypical situation. The Deuteronomist's response 
to arrange for a hearing beyond one's local community would then 
provide a remedy not just for an incident that might parallel Naboth's, 
but for many other instances of false testimony too. 
The Naboth incident concerns a completed crime, whereas in the law 
the focus is upon an attempted crime. This difference between the law 
and the narrative is accounted for precisely because of the relationship 
between them. Moses, we are to understand, could not possibly tolerate 
the judicial abomination perpetrated against Naboth. The foundation of 
his entire system of law is threatened by this particular form of injustice. 
In response to such a threat, he lays out his law providing for the 
impartial hearing at the supreme tribunal. He therefore assumes that, 
because of this safeguard, an instance of false testimony will never go 
beyond the stage of an attempted crime. The law is an ideal construction. 
4. See Carmichael (1985, pp. 95-96). 
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A problem that might also be illumined by relating law and narrative 
concerns the jus talionis that constitutes the penalty for false testimony. 
Because of the insidious nature of the offense, we might have expected 
one severe sanction for most or all forms of false prosecution. Alter-
natively, while we can see in theory the merit of a talionic sanction for a 
false accuser who threatens to bring upon someone a certain form of 
punishment depending upon the type of charge that is brought,5 we are 
left wondering why this principle of punishment is applied in this law 
and not in the comparable law in regard to the bridegroom who falsely 
claims that his new wife was not a virgin on her wedding night 
(Deut 22: 13-19). If proved, that charge would have cost her her life, but 
the lawgiver opts not for a penalty of death but for lesser penalties. We 
have to wonder why the talionic principle as a response to offenses 
themselves is not expressed in other Deuteronomic laws, although 
Eslinger ( 1981) may be right that the woman who intervenes in the fight 
and grabs the genitals of her husband's assailant suffers a talionic 
penalty (Deut 25: 11, 12). She has her hand (kappiih) cut off, but this 
term, usually denoting palm, may be hinting at her own genitals. The 
outcome of the story about Ahab may account for the particular 
expression of the talionic principle in the Deuteronomic law concerning 
false testimony. 
In the story the deity makes his judgment known through his prophet 
Elijah, "a prophet like unto me [Moses]" in the Deuteronomic view 
(Deut 18: 15). Elijah holds Ahab responsible for the offense against 
Naboth: "Hast thou killed, and also taken possession [of the vineyard]" 
(I Kgs 21:19). Jezebel herself is to experience death within Naboth's city 
for her role in his death. It is in regard to Ahab's penalty, however, that 
we first note that considerable attention is devoted to the principle of 
talion, and, significantly, the principle is applied to the false charge 
against Naboth. When we consider that the Deuteronomist is primarily 
responsible in the narrative histories for showing how retribution, often 
of a precise, mirroring kind, was visited upon those who offended the 
deity's requirements, we can readily appreciate that his law on false 
witness might incorporate similar notions of retribution. 
Ahab appropriates Naboth's land. He meets his death attempting to 
appropriate land, the city of Ramoth-gilead that is in enemy hands 
(l Kings 22). 6 Lies and deception were used against Naboth, whose 
5. The principle is expressed in other Near Eastern codes, for example, CH 1-4. 
6. Ramoth-gilead. a city of asylum (Deut 4:43). belongs to Israel and could be right-
fully reclaimed. However, entitlement was not automatic but dependent upon Israel's, or 
its representative's, observance of the commandments (cp .. e.g .. Deut 19:9). 
112 CALUM CARMICHAEL 
avenger, Elijah, is referred to by Ahab in l Kgs 21:20 as his enemy, and 
they are similarly used in bringing about Ahab's death. The elders of 
Jezreel were involved in the deception against Naboth; so too are certain 
established prophets involved in the deception against Ahab. The actions 
in each case have a judicial setting, an earthly court trafficking in lies in 
the case of the elders, and a heavenly court in the case of the prophets 
who come under its influence in speaking lies to Ahab about the 
successful outcome of the battle. Both Naboth and Ahab are killed while 
playing uncharacteristic roles. "Proclaim a fast, and set Naboth on high 
among the people" ( 1 Kgs 21 :9). While enjoying this high position 
Naboth is accused of cursing God and the king. He dies for this offense. 
Ahab dresses incognito as a common charioteer in going into battle. He 
chooses this low position with a view to escaping death, for it is known 
that the enemy will only go after the king (22:31). He should be safe, in a 
way perhaps that the honored Naboth should have been against any 
hostility within his community, but a stray arrow strikes him. The 
certain man who drew his bow at a venture was deviating from orders, 
because the king alone was to be killed. We should recall the role of the 
witnesses against N aboth, sons of Belia! as they are called, a description 
synonymous with deviant conduct: both they and the archer are in fact 
nameless individuals.7 The precise detail of the retribution visited upon 
Ahab for his offense seems to have inspired the Deuteronomic use of the 
formula of retaliation in the law. 
The formula, it might be suggested, was inspired by the Deuteronomic 
lawgiver's concentration upon the fate of the dead victim of a corrupt 
court in I Kings 21. For his offense Naboth had been stoned to death: a 
lifeless body with damage to its diverse members. Taking up from the 
story with its interest in talion, but focusing, not upon Ahab, but upon 
the wronged man, the lawgiver has judged that that victim's life and 
limbs cried out for retribution. 8 The innocence of the victim would all 
7. Namelessness appears to indicate that the person functions as a means or a tool 
(Bailey, 1970, p. 141). 
8. In l Kings 20 Ahab's life is to be taken because he let his prisoner, King Benhadad, 
escape. Twice in the story the talionic principle, "life in the place of life." is stated (vv. 39, 
42), further evidence that the narratives about Ahab reveal a special interest in talion. That 
in the histories Ahab's death is tied to the offense against Naboth and not to his leniency 
to Benhadad, I take as support for my view of the proper way to assess these histories. 
Literary critics understandably postulate different times and places of origin for the 
uneven accounts as well as an ill-fitting final arrangement of them. I suggest that such 
unevenness was of little concern to those who worked with the histories, because the 
primary aim was to exercise their legal and moral judgment on certain issues that arose in 
them. Like the Deuteronomic laws themselves, the material was brought together not 
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the more have inclined the lawgiver to contemplate the end result of the 
outrage perpetrated against him, especially when the execution was 
carried out under the direction of a court whose function it is to protect 
the innocent. In a code, for instance, in this very rule about false 
witness, that lays much emphasis upon examples of crimes that should 
be heard about and feared, it would be no surprise that the stoned body 
of Naboth presented a compelling example. 9 The story itself reveals this 
concentration upon his dead body. 
In the story there is emphasis not just upon Ahab's death as a 
mirroring penalty for the slaying of Naboth, but upon his blood after 
death being consumed by dogs in a way that mirrors what happened to 
the blood of Na both after his death (I Kgs 21: I 9, 22:38). To paraphrase 
in language similar to the Deuteronomic law: the penalty of life for life 
and blood for blood had been exacted. 10 The specific judgment in the 
story that N aboth 's life and blood required precise expiation is readily 
seen to apply to his life and bodily members. Justice could equally have 
demanded "life for life, [to be followed by] eye for eye, tooth for tooth, 
hand for hand, foot for foot" (Deut 19:21). The descriptive nature of this 
statement begins with the head and moves down to the feet and suggests 
more the model of a single victim like Naboth than, as is generally 
understood, different types of victim. The death of Jezebel is equally 
relevant to the use of the formula. When Jehu comes upon her to carry 
out retribution for what she had done to Naboth, much attention is 
devoted to her bodily parts. First she paints her eyes and adorns her 
head. Then after some words are bandied between them, Jehu orders 
that the eunuchs in her palace throw her down. Horses trample her, and 
when the command is given to bury her they "found no more of her 
than the skull and the feet and the palms of her hands" (2 Kgs 9:35). Her 
fate, we can infer, is intended to recall Naboth's ghastly end. 
On the basis of the preceding discussion we can better approach the 
difficult problem of the occurrence of the talionic formula (with its 
addition "burning for burning, wound for wound, stripe for stripe") in 
Exod 2 I :22-25, the pregnant woman involved in an affray. Critics, 
dividing the rule into two parts-the first in which the mother is unhurt 
solely according to how one unit related to the one before or after. but because the 
exploration of a certain topic in a narrative had priority. 
9. On the code's concern with the blemish left by wrongdoing, see Daube (1969). 
I 0. The lawgiver's recognition of the need to do something about a slain body is found 
in Deut 21: 1-9: its presence in the midst of the life-giving land requires expiation. The 
emphasis is upon the body after death it causes a blemish-and not upon the fact that a 
life has been taken. 
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but something untoward happens to the fetuses (the plural is used), and 
the second in which the mother's fate is the focus~claim that the second 
part is an addition to the original compilation of rules (the Mispii{im) in 
Exod 21:1-22:16(17). Some of their arguments carry weight, for ex-
ample, the formula of talion represents a switch uncharacteristic of the 
Mispiifim from the preceding third person form of address to the second 
person. The addition is attributed to the Deuteronomist. 11 After all, he 
uses the Mispiiffm in formulating his rules in Deuteronomy, and might 
well at the same time have found it convenient simply to add on to the 
material that lay before him. I wish to present different arguments that 
the rule is Deuteronomic in formulation, but reject arguments such as: 
that the use of the formula is inconsistent with the pecuniary penalty for 
the assaulted man in Exod 21: 18, 19; and that the formula conflicts with 
the fine levelled against the assailant in the first part of the rule because 
the blow to the fetuses is likely to have left a bruise at least on the 
woman.
12 
There are two Deuteronomic laws that merit attention because of the 
features they share with Exod 21 :22-25: the law about false testimony, 
because it includes the jus talionis (Deut 19:15-21); and the law about 
the immodest woman, because it is about an affray and it involves the 
only concern in Deuteronomy with a mutilating punishment to a living 
person (Deut 25:11, 12). If it were a matter of comparing these two laws 
with the one in Exod 21 :22-25, we could not say too much about any 
substantial links there might be despite the long recognized, tantalizing 
nature of the shared features. Once, however, we note the background 
histories underlying the presentation of the two Deuteronomic laws, we 
are able to advance beyond the frustrating stage of only comparing and 
contrasting the three laws in question. 
I have argued elsewhere that just as the formulation of the Deu-
teronomic levirate law (Deut 25:5-10) is dependent upon a reading of 
the problems thrown up by the Tamar story in Genesis 38, so too the 
following rule (vv. 11, 12) about the immodest woman owes its bias to 
an issue raised in the story before Tamar became pregnant. 13 I shall 
11. See Jackson (1973, pp. 303-04). 
12. For these arguments, see Jackson (1973, pp. 279-83, 290). On the basis of his 
insistence that biblical laws must be interpreted in their context, Mikliszanski (1947, 
pp. 295-98) rejected a literal meaning of "life for life, eye for eye," etc. He ran into the 
problem by noting the same conflict that Jackson notes. If he had wished to adhere to his 
principle, he should have tried to stay with the literal meaning of the formula and sought 
to reconcile the conflict. He would then have raised doubts about the unintentional 
character of the attack, and about bodily mutilations as applied to a living person. 
13. The two laws are intimately related; see Carmichael (1977, p. 332; 1985, pp. 295-99) 
and Eslinger (1981. pp. 269-81 ), although I cannot accept his argument about the tie to 
BIBLICAL LAWS OF TALION 115 
briefly sketch the link between the law and the narrative and then 
proceed to argue that the second part of the Exodus rule that includes 
the jus talionis is also inspired by the attention that has been given to, in 
this instance, the pregnant Tamar. Deut 25: l l, 12 and Exod 21:22-25 
share the same opening language ("If men strive"). 
Tamar, acting on behalf of her dead husband against Judah's failure 
to make provision to have her impregnated, took the matter into her 
own hands. Disguised as a prostitute she seduced Judah. From one 
point of view Tamar was acting wrongfully; from another she was acting 
justifiably. The law on the immodest woman is interested in Tamar's 
initiative in the dispute; the law about the pregnant woman is concerned 
with the injustice almost meted out to the pregnant Tamar. 
Her husband dead, Tamar took up and interfered in the struggle to 
obtain his right to an heir. 14 Judah was bound by family loyalty to have 
the dead man's brother provide one. A voiding an approach to the 
brother (Shelah), her interference took the form of deliberately going 
after Judah's genitals-to state the development crudely but accurately. 
In the law two men are engaged in a struggle and the wife of one of 
them helps her husband by grabbing his opponent's genitals. The 
Deuteronomist has produced a more conventional parallel to the situa-
tion in Genesis 38, but he nonetheless betrays the inspiration for his rule 
when he cites the particular form the woman's action took. 
The puzzling second part of the rule in Exod 21 :23-25, about the 
talionic punishment because of what happens to the pregnant woman, 
becomes less puzzling when we introduce as background the Deu-
teronomist's consideration of what almost happened to Tamar when it 
became known that she was pregnant. In Genesis 38 Tamar presents the 
example of a pregnant woman who, from Judah's eventually prevailing 
view that she was more righteous than he because he had failed to send 
Shelah into her (v. 26), turned out to be a potentially innocent victim of 
a capital sentence. Judah, apparently exercising his judicium domesti-
cum but making no proper enquiry, had ordered that she be subject to 
burning. 
the tradition concerning Jacob's struggle with the angel in Gen 32:25-33. It is worth 
pointing out that the levirate law is concerned with the particular instance of denial of 
progeny to a man, and in this regard is similar to Exod 21 :22 about the loss of the fetuses. 
14. The levirate law centers on the problem of the father, presumably dead, who is not 
available to insist that his son fulfill his levirate duty. Underlying both this law and the 
following law about the immodest woman are therefore the problems in Genesis 38: first, 
about a living person, Judah, who in terms of having the levirate custom observed, is 
"dead," and must be proceeded against; and second, about a dead person, Er, who because 
of the levirate custom, is "alive," and must be fought for. 
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The major question to be asked of the rule about the pregnant woman 
is why talionic punishment is laid down. Why, if she loses her life, is it 
not simply stated in keeping with preceding rules in the code that the 
person responsible be put to death (mot yumat)? Or (although I shall 
reject this reading of the text), if physical injury be the harm, that a fine 
and medical expenses be paid in keeping with the rule in Exod 21: 19? It 
is a bewildering problem-until we look at Tamar's potential fate, and 
how its parallel to the Naboth incident has inspired the same application 
of the talionic principle. If Tamar had been put to death, the issue, like 
the one prompted by the injustice to Naboth, would have arisen of 
avenging a woman with child burnt to death because she had rightfully 
conceived the child for her husband. She had been charged, not 
maliciously but in the end tantamount to a false charge, with disloyalty 
to the family she was still tied to despite the death of her husband. She 
had prostituted herself, it was claimed, to an outsider. The false charge 
against Naboth was that he had expressed disloyalty to God and the 
king. The developments that take place in each narrative arise from an 
initial struggle, a dead man continuing to claim a share in the family 
inheritance and Naboth resisting Ahab's acquisition of his ancestral 
property. 
The stoning of Naboth brought about vengeance not just for his 
death, but also for his blood. In his law about a parallel instance of 
injustice, the Deuteronomist focused upon avenging the man's death and 
bodily members. In regard to outcome, Tamar's situation differs from 
Naboth's and the differences go a long way in accounting for the 
language and substance of Exod 21 :23-25. The law states, "And if there 
be 0iison" ("harm" in RSV, "mischief" in AV, "death" in the Mekhilta). 
The reference is to the fate that might befall the woman. The term has 
proved to be a difficult one. 15 It occurs only three times outside this law 
and, significantly now in light of the Deuteronomist's interest in the 
threat to the pregnant Tamar, all three occur in the context of the 
Joseph narrative in which the Judah-Tamar story is embedded. Even 
more significantly, its meaning in the Joseph narrative has to do with a 
threat of disaster to a child, Jacob's youngest son Benjamin, a threat, 
moreover, that is intended to recall Judah's past action against Jacob's 
favorite son, Joseph. 
If Benjamin were made to accompany his brothers to Egypt, as the 
disguised Joseph had requested, his father feared that ~iison might befall 
him (Gen 42:4, 38, 44:29). In Gen 44:29 Judah himself relays the father's 
15. See Jackson's discussion of the various attempts to understand it ( 1973, pp. 274-76). 
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fears to the disguised Joseph. Benjamin indeed is in Egypt at this point 
in time, and Judah is pleading with Joseph to let him replace Benjamin, 
whom Joseph has ordered to remain in Egypt. Judah further asks to 
become a slave to Joseph (v. 33). The significance of this development is 
that Judah is being paid back in mirroring fashion for his primary role 
in selling Joseph as a slave to Egypt (Gen 37:26-28). The reason why the 
narrative about Tamar is inserted into the Joseph story is the same-
Judah is made to experience what it is like to lose sons. 16 Judah almost 
caused, such is heaven's way of working justice, his own children in 
Tamar's womb to experience (along with Tamar herself) "iison. The 
meaning of the term is death (although it is noteworthy that Tamar's 
potential demise is left similarly unstated), or what would be regarded as 
its equivalent in Benjamin's situation, slavery abroad. It is an outcome 
that is so disastrous as to warrant in Judah's words, "bringing down 
the gray hairs of thy servant our father with sorrow to the grave" 
(Gen 44:29). Its meaning is such as to rule out breaking up the talionic 
formula so that mutilation or injury without death is intended to be 
avenged by talion. 
The application of the jus talionis in the rule about the pregnant 
woman differs from its application in the rule about a potential victim of 
false testimony in at least three respects. Each of the differences is 
illuminated by taking account of the influence of the Tamar story. First 
is the difference between avenging a death sentence that a court might 
impose, because of the nature of the false charge against a man, and 
avenging a fatal assault upon a pregnant woman. In considering a 
parallel to Tamar's case, the Deuteronomist does not opt for a wrong 
that results from some house trial such as Judah's but, continuing the 
example of the struggle from the first part of the rule, concentrates on 
an attack upon a pregnant woman. 17 In opting for talionic punishment, 
16. See Carmichael (1979, pp. 57-65). Jacob's supposed blessing upon Judah in 
Gen 49:8-12 is by appearance only. Far from unqualified praise of Judah, the saying is 
heavily sarcastic and consequently condemnatory. Like Genesis 38 it concerns Judah's 
action against Joseph and the problems Judah had obtaining offspring to continue his 
line. 
17. Interpreters. assuming that the rule focuses upon an ordinary brawl with an 
innocent woman bystander, have understandable difficulty in accepting that the attack on 
the woman is anything other than unintended. See, for example, Cassuto (1967, pp. 174-
75), Morgenstern ( 1930, p. 67) and Paul ( 1970, p. 74). Yet why should we assume the less 
complicated situation. especially in legal material? Moreover, Daube's observation (1947, 
pp. I07-8) that whenever nligap is used with the accusative it refers to a deliberate act is, 
as Jackson notes ( 1973, pp. 287-88), telling evidence of the intended nature of the assault. 
The influence of the Tamar story in shaping the law is further evidence that an intended 
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however, he is influenced by the nature of the injustice Tamar almost 
experienced because of the house trial. From one angle, her situation is 
comparable to Na both 's. Not only his life but his blood also had to be 
avenged in a precise way. Likewise with Tamar if she had died: the 
added bodily members, the fetuses, would have had to be avenged along 
with her dead body. In other words, the talionic formula in Exod 21:23-
25 is like the formula in Deut 19:21-it applies to the victim in question 
and not to types of victim who differ according to the injuries sustained. 
What also stands out as reminiscent of Naboth is Tamar's innocence of 
the offense she was accused of. The horror of what happens to an 
innocent victim is, as already suggested, more likely to evoke a desire for 
intensified vengeance than if the victim had been partly to blame for a 
dispute. A further parallel is to be recalled. Naboth lost his God given 
inheritance, his vineyard. If a true Israelite woman lost her life and child 
in the way that Tamar almost lost hers, the consequence could be the 
disappearance of an Israelite's name in the land, in effect, the loss of his 
God given inheritance, his estate. 18 This aspect of the offense might also 
highlight why the punishment in the law is intensified. The obliteration 
of a man's name by causing the death of his wife and child invites 
obliteration by way of punishment. 
The application of talion in Exod 21 :23-25 also reflects the role of 
talion in the Tamar story itself, just as the role of talion in the Naboth 
story influenced its application in the law on false testimony. As already 
indicated, the insertion of the story about Tamar into the Joseph 
narrative is motivated by this very principle: Judah was bringing upon 
himself the loss of offspring because he had been behind the "death" of 
Joseph, Jacob's favorite son. We noted too that Judah's later request to 
Joseph to substitute himself for Benjamin is intended by the narrator to 
bring out the notion of exact retribution: Judah, having sold Joseph into 
slavery, was offering himself as a slave to Joseph. The puzzling mode of 
execution, burning, that Judah ordered for Tamar may well be intended 
to mirror her offense, her supposed sexual passion. 19 The association 
attack is to be understood. Little wonder that the common view, for example, Cassuto's 
(1967, p. 276), sees a conflict with Exod 21:13: "It is incomprehensible why one who hurts 
a pregnant woman accidentally should be liable to the death penalty in the case of a 
fatality, although earlier, in v. 13, it was stated that whoever killed a person unintentionally 
is not to be put to death." Scholars, such as Cassuto, have created the problem themselves. 
18. The rules about exemption from military conscription couple the man who has just 
acquired his vineyard in the land and the one who is about to acquire a wife for the 
purpose of producing his heir (Deut 20:6, 7; 24:5). 
19. Astour argues (1966, pp. 193-95) that the burning is to be explained by appeal to an 
original Canaanite version of the story before it was transformed to fit Israelite tradition. 
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between sexual passion and burning is well brought out in Prov 6:27-29, 
"Can a man take fire in his bosom, and his clothes not be burned? Can 
one go upon hot coals, and his feet not be burned? So he that goeth in 
to his neighbour's wife; whosoever toucheth her shall not be innocent. " 20 
The link between lust and its punishment in the Tamar story would add 
to Eslinger's claim (1981, p. 273) that the punishment of the immodest 
woman in Deut 25: I I, 12 similarly mirrors her offense, genitals for 
genitals. 21 However, it is the punishment that Judah deserved, if he had 
proceeded with his execution of Tamar, that is pertinent to the penalty 
in the law about the pregnant woman. The only approach to this 
hypothetical issue is to note that Judah would have done to Er what he 
appeared to have done to Jacob, namely, destroyed his son. Joseph, in 
his father's eyes, had been torn to pieces (tiirop {orap, Gen 37:33). 
Indeed, on his death-bed Jacob identified Judah -as the- supposed wild 
beast, a lion, responsible for "coming up from the prey of my son 
[mifferep beni ciilitii]" (Gen 49:9). The penalty in the law would result in 
a similar tearing to pieces of the off ender. 
A second difference between the talionic formula in Deut 19:21 and 
Exod 21 :23, 24 is the amplification in the latter: "burning for burning, 
wound for wound, stripe for stripe." Again, what almost happened to 
Tamar may provide illumination. If the formula refers, as I have argued, 
to a single victim of injustice, then Tamar's potential fate involving fire 
may have prompted the amplification: all the gruesome injuries that 
affected Naboth's body because of stoning plus burns, wounds, and 
stripes. 22 If the use of fire in the story is meant to mirror her lust, then 
Tamar was a cult prostitute, and as a sacred type who prostituted herself outside the 
sacred order of things burning by fire was the appropriate method of removing her (at 
least in Babylonian and Assyrian practice, he infers). 
20. For the affinity in language between Jacob's remarks about Judah's lovemaking in 
Gen 49: 12 and the bridegroom's description of the bride in Song of Songs, see Carmichael 
(1979, pp. 64-65). 
21. If we are to assume that the rule is intended for societal ends, then we have to think, 
as Eslinger does, about how such a penalty is to be carried out. lf my thesis has merit, no 
such consideration arises. The rule (in part) is a legal exercise, a hypothetical construction 
inspired by the attempt to produce a more conventional set of circumstances to those 
underlying the Tamar incident. The clever use of language is one indication that such rules 
are not designed to serve practical ends. 
22. kiiwii, the uncommon word in the law, is in Prov 6:28 (the scorching of the 
adulterer's feet) a parallel to siirap in Prov 6:27 (the burning of his clothes). siirap is used 
in reference to the harlot Tamar's punishment. ln Isa 3:24, the harlots, the daughters of 
Jerusalem, will experience burning (ki) instead of beauty. pe~ac ("wound") is not a 
common word either. It is used of the troubles, for example, enticement by harlots, that 
befall those who imbibe drink (Prov 24:29, 33). In Song of Songs 5:7 the watchmen of the 
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we need not think of execution being accomplished solely by fire, but by 
other physical means also so that the variety of injuries to her body 
would outnumber those to Naboth's. In any event, because the law 
provides but a parallel to Tamar's situation, it contemplates a variety of 
injuries that occur before or after death. 
A third difference is that the formula in Exodus uses the preposition 
tal:wt ("in place of") and not b ("for") as in Deuteronomy. It is again 
noteworthy that the narrative about Tamar, because it is dominated by 
the levirate custom, is concerned with notions of replacement. Onan 
stands in for Er, and when Onan is struck down, Tamar tricks Judah 
into being a replacement because he had been reluctant to let Shelah 
replace Onan. If the pregnant Tamar had been put to death for her 
activity the attempt to have her child take the place of her dead husband 
would have failed. 23 In redressing the wrong done to any pregnant 
woman, the punishment should mirror the offense by somehow bringing 
in the notion of substitution. The narrative about the wrong done to 
Naboth does not raise the same notions of substitution. 
The discussion of the occurrence of the talionic formula in Exod 21 :22-
25 might be summarized. It is typical of the Deuteronomist to pursue, in 
a fashion reminiscent of the sage's counsel in the book of Proverbs, 
contrasting issues. 24 Aside from presenting (in Deut 25: 11, 12) an offense 
by a woman that might parallel Tamar's method of fighting for the 
rights of her dead husband, he has also been interested in the contrasting 
aspect: an offense that parallels the wrong that was almost done to the 
pregnant Tamar. In that the Deuteronomist uses the rules in the Book of 
the Covenant in formulating his, it is quite possible that he added to 
them also and that these additions are to be found in the Book of the 
Covenant. In other words, only a rule (Exod 21 :22) about damage to a 
fetus is ultimately pre-Deuteronomic because at that stage the focus was 
partly upon injuries to non-persons, slaves in Exod 21:20, 21, fetuses 
in Exod 21:22, and slaves again in Exod 21:26, 27. A concern with the 
mother is out of place in this context, even though it is easily seen how 
the question of calamity befalling her might arise (cp. CH para. 209, the 
death of a fetus, followed by para. 210, the death of the mother). It was 
the Deuteronomist who took the topic about the fetus further, because 
city wound the woman as she searches for her lover, possibly because they regard her as a 
harlot. 
23. There is a sense in which the birth of a male child has this significance independent 
of the special circumstances of the levirate situation. 
24. On this aspect of setting down instruction, see Carmichael (1985, pp. 213, 297-98, 
301). 
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in characteristic fashion the narrative about Tamar encouraged him to 
do so, and he consequently raised the issue of death to the mother. The 
Tamar story-scrutinized, we might imagine, in a school setting for 
legal, instructional purposes-would explain the very real puzzle as to 
why a rule about a pregnant woman should include the punishment of 
talion. The similarity the Deuteronomist found between what occurred 
with Naboth and what might have happened to Tamar is the link. This 
link was further encouraged because the Tamar story had in another 
context prompted a rule that required a mutilating penalty. 
Before turning to Lev 24:19, 20, I wish to indicate that even the first 
part of the rule about the fetuses in Exod 21:22 may owe a good deal 
also to the typical Deuteronomic process of formulating a law by 
bringing it into connection with a narrative. It is beyond the scope of 
this article to indicate why the topic of a blow to a pregnant woman first 
arose in the context of the Book of the Covenant. Obviously, an enquiry 
into the rules concerning assault that precede it, for example the 
immediately preceding one about a blow to a slave, is relevant, as is per-
haps the recognition that had to be given to Moses's role as a judge of 
quarrels in Exod 2:11-14. However the topic arose, the influence of the 
Tamar story upon a rule on the subject is again observable. 
If Tamar had died, her death would have been the consequence of the 
peculiar struggle between Er and his father and brother. Er pressured 
Judah from his grave to exercise his patriapotestas to ensure that 
another of his sons fulfilled the levirate duty. Onan acted against his 
dead brother (and against his father also). Judah, failing to replace 
Onan with Shelah, was in turn also acting against Er. It was at this stage 
that Tamar intervened in the struggle on behalf of her dead husband. 
She became pregnant with twins. An exploration of this set of circum-
stances, for the purpose of pursuing a legal topic in a hypothetical 
fashion, illuminates the text of Exod 21:22 in which the pregnant mother 
is unhurt but "her children come out." Interpreters have been puzzled by 
this reference to children rather than to a single child. They have been 
puzzled too by the details of the struggle: it is not necessarily confined to 
two men, who are described as having struck her, although only one of 
them is held accountable. 25 The conflict involving three men in Genesis 
25. As Jackson points out (1973, pp. 287-88), it is the LXX and Syriac versions that 
contemplate a fight between two men. The MT has no such restriction and Jackson thinks 
of a number of men as participants. Cassuto implausibly claims (1967, p. 275) that we are 
dealing with a generic plural in each instance to indicate that one or other of the 
combatants hurt her and that the fetus may be male or female. Morgenstern (1930, p. 67), 
noting that the Samaritan and Septuagint versions read the singular, took the MT as 
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38, one of whom in the end directly moved against Tamar, and Tamar's 
twin children would explain the puzzling references in the rule. We 
might also point out that the Tamar incident would also solve a puzzle 
noted by many interpreters as to how it could be known that, in the 
event of a fatal assault to the woman, she was pregnant at the time. 
Tamar was at least three months advanced in pregnancy when Judah 
judged that she had played the harlot (Gen 38:24). 
Another major crux in the rule is resolved if we consider the influence 
of the narrative. Should the children be the only ones to suffer, the man 
responsible is liable to monetary damages "according as the woman's 
husband lays upon him." The rule then continues, venatan biplilfm, and 
interpreters have viewed this statement about the involvement of judges 
as being at odds with the preceding one that gives the husband an 
unfettered right to obtain the sum of money he claims as compensation. 
Jackson lays out the many attempts to resolve the conflict and finds 
them all suspect, except for Daube's solution. 26 Daube claims that the 
clause is an interpolation belonging to a time when private disputes were 
attracting public interest, because the aim was to curtail the resort to 
self-remedies. No problem in the text exists, however, once we observe 
that the rule also takes into account a situation that might parallel the 
hypothetical one suggested by the Tamar story. In other words, the rule 
first states the normal position in which the husband is alive and can 
make his claim. It then turns to the exceptional situation where the 
husband is dead and requires the claim to be made with judges. The text 
therefore reads, "And if men strive and strike a pregnant woman and her 
children come out, and death [to the mother] does not ensue, he [the one 
who struck her] shall be strictly fined according as the woman's husband 
shall lay upon him, or he shall pay through judges." In venatan biplflfm 
the vav connects an alternative case as in, for example, Exod 21: f6; the 
beth has the sense of instrument or means by which the payment is 
made. 
The two texts, Exod 21:23-25 and Deut 19:15-21, that contain the 
talionic formula are not about talion as generally understood. Rather 
they are about intensified vengeance or the intensification of the death 
sentence, "eine Verschiirfung der Todesstrafe. '' 27 A parallel instance 
would be the practice recognized in Deut 21 :22 where a man is first put 
original and wondered whether, because the text was legal writing, the assumption is not 
in fact that the woman might have been carrying twins. 
26. See Jackson (1973, pp. 277-79) and Daube (1947, pp. 108, 149 n. 14). 
27. The expression of Keil and Delitzsch (1870, p. 510), in regard to the law about the 
hanged man (Deut 21:22, 23). 
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to death and his body incurs disgrace by being then hung up for public 
gaze. Only in Lev 24: 19, 20 does the formula truly refer to talionic 
punishments. The relationship between the Deuteronomic and Levitical 
laws is complex. Detailed examination of similar material proves con-
clusively, however, that the Levitical laws, or at least their formulations, 
are later. 28 
In explaining the occurrence of the talionic formula in Deut 19: 15-21 
by appeal to the N aboth incident, we can go further and claim that the 
formula as such is original to the Deuteronomic law about false 
testimony. 29 This claim is based on the observation that the detailed 
concern with what happened to the bodies of Ahab and Jezebel is the 
primary inspiration for its composition. If we assume, as we are en-
couraged to do by the often striking nature of the parallel material, that 
the Levitical writer knew the Deuteronomic material, then Lev 24: 10-23 
provides a further example of such parallelism. 
After the initial, unresolved dispute between Ahab and Naboth, there 
followed the false accusation that Naboth had reviled God and the king. 
The false charge of blasphemy led to a capital sentence from the corrupt 
judicial authorities. Out of this complex context, because the sentence in 
fact constituted murder, comes the Deuteronomist's rule about the 
application of talion. In Lev 24: 10-23 the issue is also about an 
unresolved quarrel between two men, and one of them, a non-Israelite, 
proceeds to revile God. Then into the context of a judicial enquiry that 
pronounces a death sentence upon the blasphemer comes the statement 
of an apparently existing rule, presumably one that applied to Israelites 
previously, about the punishment for a blasphemer and, most puzzling, 
a rule about murder, which in turn, just as in Deuteronomy, leads to 
rules about the application of talion. 30 If we were to set out the 
Deuteronomist's procedure as comparable to the priestly writer's we 
28. See Carmichael (1982, pp. 411-12) and (1981, pp. 35-37); also Jackson (1973. 
pp. 303-04). 
29. As Jackson notes ( 1973, p. 300), no ancient Near Eastern source formulates the law 
of bodily injuries by the use of maxims. 
30. Although Noth (1965, p. 180) regards the rules about murder, killing a beast, and 
bodily injuries as being insertions from elsewhere, he gives no reason why it is these rules 
that are inserted and not others. He indicates, without any argumentation, that they were 
already attached to a rule about blasphemy and that the latter's insertion drew the others 
along with it. Should this observation be correct, we would still wish to know why a 
prohibition about blasphemy is followed by the prohibition against murder. During a 
summer seminar for College teachers that I directed for the National Endowment for the 
Humanities in 1985, Professor Walter Renaud, William Woods College, Fulton, Missouri, 
suggested that the topic of murder and bodily injuries might arise in the context of 
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would have: the dispute between Ahab and Naboth that led to the 
alleged offense of blasphemy; the trial to determine the offender's fate, 
namely, death for the blasphemer; a rule about false testimony, because 
the death sentence was tantamount to the crime of murder; and the 
application of talion. The intricate nature of the two parallel contexts is 
such as to rule out coincidence and to assign precedence to the 
Deuteronomic sequence. 
The Levitical writer covers ground similar to the Deuteronomist's, but 
in his own terms and partly with an eye to generalization and system-
atization. In doing so, he may be reacting negatively to the Deu-
teronomist's narrow application of the talionic principle. What might 
motivate his reaction is difficult to say. Possibly he first reacts to the 
complexity of the Deuteronomist's procedure, because it deals with a 
fabricated offense, by setting down a corresponding account of a true 
case of blasphemy. He then proceeds to oppose the Deuteronomist's 
concern with a criminal after his death, perhaps because of priestly 
opposition to too much involvement with a dead body. In any event, we 
can claim that the Levitical writer sets down the rule against murder 
after the pronouncement of the death sentence upon the blasphemer 
because the Deuteronomist's procedure determines his. 31 
In the Deuteronomist's case of blasphemy the true offender turned out 
to be the one who murdered Naboth, Ahab being explicitly condemned 
for the murder in I Kgs 21:19. It was Ahab's death, and his wife's, that 
raised the topic of talion both in the episode and in a legal context (the 
law about false testimony). The priestly writer takes up the topic of 
talion but not as it applies to the dead body of a criminal. Thus he does 
not apply the phrase "life for life" in regard to murder. Instead he 
separates it from any link with murder and gives it an application that 
requires a living creature: one who causes the death of an animal has to 
provide a live one in its place. 32 He then applies the principle of talion, 
Lev 24: I0-23 because of the initial quarrel between the two men. However, as he also 
pointed out, the inclusion of a rule about causing the death of an animal would not fit this 
explanation. 
31. To be sure, he pursues other aims also, in particular, the application to an alien as 
well as to an Israelite of the Jaw about cursing the name of the Israelite god. In this regard, 
a typical Deuteronomic procedure is worth recalling: laws are formulated in response to 
problems that arose between Israelites and non-Israelites (e.g., Simeon and l.evi and the 
Shechemites in Genesis 34), or problems involving half-Israelites (Er, Onan, and Shelah 
have a Canaanite mother). For this procedure, see Carmichael (1985, pp. 185-205). 
32. It is thus the attention given to the talionic principle that determines why a rule 
about causing the death of an animal should follow one about murder. The juxtaposition 
of the two rules is, in the absence of some such consideration, strange. Morgenstern ( 1930, 
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for which he had a Deuteronomic precedent in Deut 25: 11, 12 (the 
immodest woman), to living persons who have suffered bodily mutila-
tions. Repeating the two rules (only in reverse order this time) about 
murder and the death of an animal, he relates the actual stoning of the 
blasphemer. 
We have then the sequence in Lev 24: 13-23: a blasphemer is to be 
stoned, he is to be put to death; a murderer is to be put to death; one 
who kills another's animal is to give a live animal, life for life; one who 
disfigures someone is to be disfigured himself, fracture for fracture, eye 
for eye, tooth for tooth; one who kills an animal is to make it good; the 
murderer is to be put to death; the blasphemer is stoned to death. There 
may be a deliberate attempt to break up the unitary character of the 
Deuteronomic formula. Not only is "life for life" separated from bodily 
mutilations, but it is also no longer linked to murder. Indeed, in the 
repeated statement about the death of an animal the phrase is not 
repeated. The omission could be an indication of the Levitical writer's 
intention to remove the talionic formula from its association with death, 
the Deuteronomist's sole use of it. 
I have argued that in the Old Testament the four legal texts 
(Exod 21:22-25; Deut 19:15-21, 25:11, 12; Lev 24:18-20) concerning 
talion prove to be closely related to one another. That this may be a 
surprising result is perhaps indicated by the scattered nature of the texts 
in question and the different contexts in which they are found. 33 Aside 
from the far from insignificant talionic element, another indication that 
there might be more in common than would appear is that each text 
concerns a dispute, and obviously the queston of talion need not arise 
solely in regard to conflicts: "If men strive" (Exod 21 :22 and Deut 25: 11, 
12); "The men between whom the controversy is" (Deut 19:17); and 
"This son of the lsraelitish woman and a man of Israel strove in the 
camp" (Lev 24:10). The interest in talion comes from narrative accounts, 
as we might possibly expect, because narrative so often provides scope 
for expressing the universal and ageless concern with retaliation that is 
of a precisely mirroring kind. 34 
pp. 78-79) thinks it is "sheer nonsense" to apply "life for life" to the repayment of a living 
animal for a dead one. "Animal for animal" should have been used, he asserts. He has a 
point, but all the more is the question raised why "life for life" was used. Its use suggests 
that the levitical writer was reacting against its previous use. 
33. It is certainly a result far removed from the assessment of a recent critic who, 
representing a common view, states in regard to Exod 21:23-25, Deut 19:15-21, and 
Lev 24: 18-20 that the formula of talion "is a quotation in all three passages with no 
essential connection with its context" (Mayes, 198 L p. 291 ). Cnderlying such judgments is 
a demeaning view of the abilities of the supposed interpolators. 
34. Just how extensive a feature talion in different senses is, see Daube (1981, pp. 51-60). 
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